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t .~ ... bis fl random variable wit:h n11.•<111 l\(h) ""e ;1nd densit\' l(h). Further, dC'firw 
bk = K., nnd assume f 11 ·• 0 and f'K , ,. < O. ln all tl11;·1· 1::1sQs it is ciss111:11. d 
l ~l 1 ~l 
that the firm seeks to maximize expected utility frc,m profits; that it:.s 
11ttit:ude toward risk c~rn he <lt•scribed by a von Nt.•unw1m-->h1rgenstl•rr1 card.ind l 
utility function (U) :rnd that the decision concerninr: tlw utilization 1'r i1;:)•il 
is n11de prior to knowJed~~e of the market situation. Fi11:1lly, we assume t:!Ftt 
the Input price is def~cr ibed by the functJon r = r(t~). 
i I. CASE 1 
Profits for the f.irm fnclng nn uncertain price .1rt~ :;Lven by 
11 "' pq - r (I<) K (1) 
Under the assumption that the firm maximize~' tlw expc<-t<·d utility of !HUI-Lt , , 
first and second ordei· cond:i.tions f,ir a maximum ;.ire rc'SJ•c·ctivelv, 
E [U'(n) (pr,, - r(i<) - r 1.K) ~. \ ,. 0 ('.'.) 
and 
B 
") 
E{ll"(1r) (pf,.-r(K) ·- rKK)'- + U' (n) (·>I r i· ')l" )} ~ I KK- KK'-~ K 1) 
Here, as elsewhere, we shall 3ssume that the second ord0r condition holds. 
I , , 
) ' 
To demonstrate that the firm will demand less of K and, therefore, produce Lt:;c, 
of-q in the case of urwertainty, we follow Sam.Imo (5) and compare the uncert :in 
case with the case where p is known to take i.ts mean value p with certa)ntv. 
After a slight manipulati.on (2) can be rewritten as 
f K Co v ( U 1 ( 1r) , p) 
pfK = r(K) + r K - · --------K "1iTLi 1 (1r)} - -
(4) 
t~uw dif[l~rentiati.on or L1'(11) with respect top obtains U11 (1T) q which will l)•' 
Jess than zero if the firm is risk averse, equal to zero if the firm is risk 
neutral and less than zero J_f tlw firm is a t·isk pre ferrer. Consequently, tl11' 
risk ;1verne (preferri:1g) fin11 wl.ll ,~mploy les~> (mon') nf the fnctor ln iln 11:1--
certain wor.1 d, nnd !icncv, w [ l I produce less (more) i 11 ;m uncertain world, wl1 i I,. 
tlw risk neutral firm eqt1<1tcs tlw expected value of its marginal prJ·luct tP 
marginal outlay. 
. , 
To examine the effect of an increase in risk as defined by an increased 
variability of tlw dvnslty f1111ctJon of pcll'l' In terms or ;1 mean prcservinr~ 
sprNHl, define p*=p-y+i: \\1hL·re 1and0 <HL' shlft p;iratnl•tvr·-; which ini.tL1llv t·n•1.·1! 
one and zero respectivclv. Noting that ;1 men11 preserving spread impliL'S 
dO ( ) d7"' - µ, and substituting p* for p in 2 and differenLi.ating with respect 
(remembering that y = 1 and (:'~ = 0 originally) to y obtains 
To rrocecd note that foJ lowing San<lmo(5) profit can be •,.;ritten as 1r= E(11) 
(p-µ)q and further that IT > E(11) for p > µ. Now a risk averse firm is char-
acterize<l by uu(n) < 0 which umplics U'(TI) < U'{E(n)) for p > µ. Multiplying 
both si<ks of this i1wqu~11.lty by fK(p-11) nnJ taking expectations, remembering 
1/ 
that E('!T) is a fixed number, obtains E{U' ('IT)fK(p-lJ)} < O.·- This result and 
the faet that by(3) B < 0 est:1hlishes that the sign o[ ;1_~ depends upon tlw ':irsr 
:iy 
term on the right hand side of (5). Followfog Batra .::ind Ullah (2) it will bl· 
demonstrated that for a firm characterized by decreasing absolute risk avl!r·:i,·i;, 
~~· < O, i.e., the right side of (5) is positive. To proceed, recall that t 
firm's altitude toward risk can be defined by its absolute risk aversion 
lJ II ('If ) 
function R (n)= -·u--i-(·-)'"' Now rc·writing the first term ln the braces on the 
a rr 
right hand side of'(5) we have 
\vhi1·h in turn can bl' rc"wdttt·n 
r(K)+r K K 
-------f K 
+ 
i:(K)+rKK 
··-----· 
EK 
1 ) 
- \JJ J 
.• , .. 
.• 
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Now under risk avers:lon the first term wi 1 l be positivt• :ir1d we h;1ve alreadv 
demonstrated that 
-
r(K) + rKK 
---·---- - ]J < 0 for the risk avc·rse firm. Therefor•.•, ,,.,. 
fK 
Aga:in, fullowl11g Sandmo (5) 
let ;1 be the profit level when pfK = r(K) + r KK. Now if R (Tr)> 0 and R 1 (·•·i 
a a 
then it follows that 
~(20_ 
lJ I (1f) 
-
= R ( n ) < Ra (n ) 
a 
I' 
where· R:1(ii) is a given number. Now multiplying both sidc•s by -U'('rr) (pfK-r/>!(:.:: 
and taking expectations obtaJns 
by (2). Thereforc-, tfw right kind side of (5) is positivl', and we m;1y n>11c 1,,,'1· 
that an increase. in y leads to a decrease in the level 11[ input utilized :rn 1 
consequently to a dcclin.e i.n production. 
rurning t.o the effect of ~·1n l.ncrensc in the expectc~d value of p, rewr.Ltv ,!· 
p + 0, substitute this into (2), diffeH•ntiate with 1·espect to (:) and evalu:1te 
the derivatives at 8 = 0 to obtain 
By our earlier arguments it is clear that. the right side of (6) is ne.gntive sti 
that the effect of nn increase in expected price is a greater utilization of 
K, and hence a J ;irgcr output. 
III. CASE 2 
Tn ease 2, tlw e:.;pected ut.ility from profits for the monop:.wnistic fin11 
can be written 
E{U(pq-r(K)K)} (7) 
where p is non-stochastic and q af(K), To dcmonstr:lte lhat the results nb-
.1-· .. 
... , ... 
' .,; 
~-
'..:,.,,~)·'' 
tained for the firm facing an uncertain price apply in t11is case, it is suffi-
'\, 
cient to recognize that we can define a new variable p '" ap which wi 11 hav<.! 
'\, 
expectation ap = µ and the proofs presented above will apply directly once w0 
redeflne (7) to read 
'V 
E{U(pf(K)-r(K)K)} 
and replace µ with ~ in the above. 
(8) 
Therefore, the monopsonistic firm facing producti.cn uncertainty as ch;l'·-
acterized in this model will hire less in the uncertain case than in its ccr-
tuinty equivalent. An increase in ris~ defined by a me~m prescrvi.ng spread ,, , 
f(a) will decrease the level of factor inputs hired. Finally, an increase in 
the expected value of a will lead to incn~ased factor employment. 
IV. CASE 3 
The analysis of case 3 is not nearly as clearcut as for the two prev i.ou:.; 
cases since the proflt function is no longer a Une:ir h1nction of the randnrn 
variable. However, it is straightforward to repli.cntc~ the basic results lt1tti 
and Ullah (4) have found for the competitive fi.rm, i. ('., a risk neutral morn•p!.'' -
nistic firm will demand less of the factor of production in the uncertain 
than in the certain case, As before the rnonopsonist l.c firm seeks to met xi mi ZL' 
E{U(pE(bK)-r(K)K)} (9) 
First and second otder conditions for a maximum are respectively, 
and 
E{U' (n) (pbfK (bK)-rKK-t(K) ) } = 0 
1 
(10) 
( : 
Now the first order condition, following the previous dJ.scussion can be reweit.tcr· 
H.S 
pCov[U'(1r),bf 1, J 
"1 
E[U' (n) J 
(12) 
.. 
Now fu1l(>Wing Ratti. ;11111 Lil lah (lf) we note th.it 
Clbfk 
l JU' (1T) 
---- ~= pU"\11)Kf, ,tnd .,.lb 
cib Kl 
fK K K 
. 1 1, 1 ___ L-..:::_ __ 
f ' 
Kl 
T. e. the elnsticity of the mnrgl11. 1 1 r:roduct curVl'. l l 
tlds elasticity is greater th:m --l., then Cov (U'("ll), bl,,.) \.Jill take the c' ; .. 
l 
. ')I 
sign as U11 (T1) -=- . Assuming this is the case implic1 s Lh:1t the risk prefer:: 
firm will demand more of K than the risk neutral. firm i·:hUe the risk neutr.11 
will employ K up to the point where the expected val1H' ,1f its marginal produc 
cquz.il to marginal outlay (rKK+r(K) ) for the input. 
Turn:ing to the analysis of relative ·Input: dc·m:rnd >1·1 the certain and u11<.-vt· · 
tain cnses note that under eonditL0ns of certainty the• first order eonr1itic1·1 1, ·· 
a maxi.mum for the risk neut:r;ll flrm ls 
pf-~f, (i?K) = r(K)+r 1/ (11) Kl 
and for the uncertainty case· the f ixst · ord(:r co1H.lit i(,11 is 
pE{bfK } = r(K) + r K K 1 
(13 I) 
The fact that bf1 (bK) will be concave in b lf p· is 11u11increasing in K1 IScv (1 
and Ullah (4) ) implies by Jensen's inequ~lity that 
(~f' U'.K) " E{hfl, (hK) } 
1\1 "1 
(14) 
:.z _l t ( I 
which in turn implies tlwt the marginal outlay for Ll1t• risk neutral firm i11 tJ,, 
certctln case is greater than thL~ marginal outlay for the risk neutral flrm i11 tii· 
:.!ncertain case if E: is nonincrcasing in K1 . Now if m;irginal outlay is an Li,.,-,, 1· 
ing function of K, which is insured lf rKK > 0, then the risk neutral fini1 '.'i'' 
i h . 3/ hire more in the certain ens'~ than · n t e uncertain c;1se .--
,, . 
.. ~ ... 
. • 
To sel? the effect of an increase in unc(•rt.1intv, ll'I f(b) undergo a !1w ;1:-
pres,:rving spread. Define b* ,.,. yb+O, then rvplacc h j11 (Jn) wlth b*, uiff,·:1·11 
U.ate with respect toy and cvalu,1te the clcrivntl.vc·~; :it i"'l nnd O=O (notin·' 
dU 
that -~Jy = -B) to obtain 
+ U'('1) p(b-f:\)fK (l+c)} 
1 
Now for the risk neutral firm U 11 ~) = 0, therefore, the sign of (15) depend1 
upon -pE{U'(n) (b-B)fK (l+E)} 
. l 
-pCov{U'(n)fK (l+c), (b-l;,)}, whi.ch will be 
l 
positive for the risk neutral firm provided the elnHtlcity of marginal proJ11cr 
curve is declin.ing. Therefore, an increase in unccn;1inty will lead Lhc rLsk 
11eut1'.ill firm to hlrl' lt.::->s of the tnput. 
I'he final. case to bl.~ l'xami1wd ls the effect of "" l.111·rense in the c::pc•<·t, ,: 
valtrn of b. To proceed, repJnce b in (10) by b* = b+<.' .ind differentiat1_:o wil:. 
respect to 8. Evnlunting the derivative at 0 ·:: 0 thvn tibtains 
-E{U"(11) pfK K + (pbfK -r(K)-rKK) + U' (n) pfK (1+£)} 
1 1 1 
(16) 
Our earlier assumptions about the elasticity of the m.1rginal product curve 
impl.ies that the term on the right hand side of (16) will be negative for Lhv 
risk neutral firm. Therefore, as the expected flow of services obtainable from 
a gLvcn level of lnput ldretl rises th1.;~ risk neutral mnnopsonist will hixe mon~ 
u f the factor. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Tt has been demonstrate·i thnl tlH' standnrtl resul.ts obtained for compel it; 
firms in an uncc•rtain world can bl' easily extended to the. theory of monnp~-;11n i : 
firms. Namely, a monopsonistic firm facing price uncertainty or multiplicativ1.; 
.... 8 -
, . 
. ... 
produ('l if111 uneertainty will utlli2.e less (mo11·) of thr· input thiln lt would ln 
a certain world if the firm is risk averse (prefc.rring). Further, an 
increase in uncertainty in these two cases will res 11l t in decreased 
factor utilization if the firm is characterized by nanincreasing absolute ri~k 
aversion. 
For the risk neutral monopsonistic firm facing .1n 1incertaJn flow o[ f;J(_t11i-
t-H'rvices it can he sh01m, under nppropriatc :rns1.1mpti• 111:., that the flrrn will 
utilize less of the ft1ctor than it would in a world nf certainty. Also, a11 in-
crease in uncertainty will lead the risk-neutral firm t1l utilize less of th,~· 
factor while an increase in the expected flow 0f foctcn ::·ervices will prnmpt 
incr1!a::-~ed input h.ir:lng. 
. . ,,. 
~ . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Note that the inequality U'('rr)fK(p-)J) < U'{E(P) 11 fK(p-ii) i11,lds for 111 !'· 
2 As R;:itti and Ullah (l,li) point, out this rcstrit1 inn holds for the Cobb--
Douglas, the CES and trnnscendental produetion funct i11ns. Of course, if thi' i·,, 
not the c;ise then the sign of Cov(U'(-n), bfK) wUl he the nrpos1.te of the 
1 
sign of U"(-rT). Somewhat paradoxi.cally, thls suggest~' tli:.it the risk avcrter 
will hire more than the ~isk preferring firm. 
31t is interesting to note that Ratti and Ullah (4) use a similar ;:ir;~11rnr•nt. 
their equations 18-23, in an attempt to establish the• same point for the com-
pet it ive firm. While they establish the analogue cir ( 14), their equaU1m ( 2 _;), 
they fnl.l to real iz1~ tlut both sides of the ;rn;i]ogu1, ,.r (Jl1) ~ire equ;1tcd tu 1· 
p 
in the competitive cnse which, of course, is a contradiction. ft is not 
clear, therefore, that they have established a simiLie proposition for thP 
competitive firm. 
'( .. · . 
... ~ : ... 
The Mmiopsonistic Ff.rm in an llncert.:iin 1.~'cq·[d 
!n n~cent years tilt~ th12ory of the competitive firm nperatlng in an uncL·r-
tain environment has received n good deal of ;:ittcntinn. Several excellent r,>c1pers 
(Sandow (5), Leland (3) and Batra and Ullah (2) ) have ex~mined the implications 
of an 1mcertain price for the cnmpetit..i.ve firm, while R:1ttf. and l!llah (/1) :ind 
Batra Cl) have provided ev:icl~ncc on the competitive fl.rm operating under pro-
duct i t>n uncertainty. 
i\1 tl1Pugh Leland (J) has c6nsi.dered tli.::~ belwviour til ;1 price settln~ fi 1::1 
in nn uncertain world, the case of n monopsnnistic firm kis apparently not ,·1~t 
been examined. Tltc' p11rpose or tld.s note is to demonstr;i!:t• tlwt the result;~ 
obtained for competi.ti\re firms "re, in the main, easily , ~:tended to the en,-~,. 
of the monopsonistic finn. To sharpen the results and t•.• simplify thr~ dcri\·.1-
tions a simple model n~qui ring C111ly orie input is used. 
l. THE MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Three different types of uncertainty will be examined. Case 1 consider:.; 
the monopsonistic firm facing an unc~rtain price p with density function f(p) 
and mean E(p) = p. Prodt.1ct:lon ts characterized by q = f(k) where q is output 
and K ls input~ it is :1ssumed that fl{> 0 and fKK < 0. Case 2 examines thl 
bclwvinur of the monopsonistic firm under production uncertainty character·i.z1•li 
by the production relationship q • af (K) where a is a random variable with 
mean E(a) •a and density f(a). In this case pis non-stochastic and it is 
assuml~d that fK '> 0 nnd fKK < 0. TIH~ final case to be considered is that of 
~ pro~!uctlon uncertainty g<•twrntcd by the production relationship q = f(bK) where• 
